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Petitioner Prosper Team, Inc. respectfully submits this Reply Brief on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
Prosper Team, Inc., ("Prosper") terminated Matt Davis ("Davis") for failure to 
adhere to his assigned schedule and for injury caused thereby. The parties agree that 
Davis regularly deviated from his assigned schedule. This conduct was contrary to 
Davis? job requirements as explained during employment orientation and reinforced 
through oral and written warnings. At no time during Davis1 two-month employment at 
Prosper did Prosper condone this non-conforming behavior. The question in this case is 
whether Prospers verbal and written warnings are sufficient to overcome Davis1 
uncorroborated testimony that he felt he could set his own schedule. Prosper asserts 
that Board's decision is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of 
the whole record, Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(4)(g), and the decision to award 
benefits was arbitrary or capricious. Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(4)(h)(iv). 
I. PROSPERS REPLY TO THE BOARD'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Workforce Appeals Board ("Board") in its Brief (hereinafter B. at ), states 
that it "supplements and corrects" Prosper's Statement of Fact. Prosper responds to the 
Board's supplemental facts as follows: 
The Board states that Davis worked on a commission-only basis. (B. at 3). Davis 
was paid commissions for sales he made but he was also entitled to minimum 
wage (and overtime) when sales resulted in commissions less than minimum 
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wage. (R. at 084). Davis testified that Prosper didn't like him working a lot of 
overtime, (R. at 068:43), which is inconsistent with Davis being paid 
commissions only. Prosper asserts that the method of compensating Davis is 
largely irrelevant except the Board alleges that since Davis was paid 
commissions he was "entitled to a little latitude in his schedule". (B. at 9). There 
is no correlation between being paid commissions and being "entitled" to latitude 
in setting one's schedule. 
• Prosper agrees that "The Claimant received a schedule when he first started work 
that designed to maximize client contact opportunities." (B. at 3). Prosper also 
agrees with the Board that Prosper issued a written warning "outlining the 
schedule the Employer expected the Claimant to work." (B. at 4)(emphasis 
added). Based on these admissions, it was arbitrary or capricious for the Board 
to find that Davis did not have "knowledge" of what was expected of him when 
the Board states Prosper outlined the schedule Prosper "expected the Claimant to 
work." (Emphasis added). 
• The Board states that as a skilled sales representative Davis felt he was free to 
deviate from the schedule. (B. at 4). There is no correlation between the skill of 
a salesman and the right to set his or her schedule. There is nothing in the record 
to establish Prosper granted skilled sales representative any greater latitude with 
their schedules. Even if Prosper did allow experienced sales representatives 
greater latitude, Davis only had work at Prosper for two months from March 1, 
2010 to May 14, 2010. 
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The Board states that Davis believed he was free to deviate from his assigned 
schedule in order to set appointments and to meet client needs. Prosper did allow 
its employees limited latitude to modify their schedules based upon receiving 
prior approval to do so. Approval was required because deviations from work 
schedules were the exception rather than the rule. (R. at 044:16-17; 068:27-33). 
Davis regularly failed to obtain the required prior approval before altering his 
schedule. (R. at 050:33-34). There was no evidence that Davis modified his 
schedule to in fact meet any client needs. 
The Board states that Davis saw others including his supervisor deviate from 
their schedules. (B. at 4). Davis admitted that he "assumed" other employees 
were assigned the same schedule. (R. at 058:21). Davis1 supervisor testified that 
he (the supervisor) was in fact was not assigned the same schedule. (R. at 
054:11-12). 
The Board states "The Claimant often left early or arrived late, yet still worked 
more than 46 hours each week..." Davis did often leave early and arrive late, 
however, Davis was terminated for failing to adhere to his assigned schedule not 
for the number of hours he worked. The written warning issued on April 14, 
2010, instructed Davis to work his assigned schedule not to work more hours. 
Reciting the number of hours worked does not address Prospers injury from 
Davis' disobedience, insubordination and violation of company rules. 
The Board states that despite several verbal warnings, "the Employer took no 
concrete action with the Claimant until it issued a written warning on April 12, 
3 
2010". (B. at 4). There is no legal definition of "concrete action" in an 
employment setting. There is no basis in law or fact that Prosper did not take 
concrete action because it issued verbal and email warnings. It is universally 
accepted that verbal warnings are a form of discipline. Since the Board correctly 
states that Prosper "issued several verbal warnings and expressed its 
dissatisfaction through email messages,"(B. at 13), it is contrary to the weight of 
the evidence to suggest that Prosper did not take "concrete action" until it issued 
the formal written warning. 
• Davis missed an appointment with a customer on April 12, 2010. The Board 
states that "The Claimant remedied the problem, however, contacting the 
customer as soon as he arrived at work." (B. at 4). Davis may have remedied his 
failure to contact the customer on time, but there is no evidence Davis did or 
could remedy the injury Prosper may have suffered in goodwill, trust and 
customer confidence. Prosper disputes that Davis "remedied" the problem. 
• The Board states that after the April 12 warning, there is no indication that 
Davis missed any other scheduled appointments. (B. at 4). A lack of testimony is 
not evidence something did not occur. As Davis was terminated for failing to 
adhere to his schedule, evidence of missed appointments was only one of the 
consequences of his non-adherence. Prosper was not obligated to provide proof 
of additional missed appointments. 
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• The Board states Prosper "did not tell the Claimant he was being discharged for 
attendance issues." (B. at 5). Prosper expressly testified "Your dismissal is based 
upon attendance." (R. at 055:34). 
II. THE WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD MISUNDERSTANDS THE 
NATURE OF DAVIS1 POSITION AT PROSPER. 
The Board advances that since Davis was paid commissions, Davis was 
"entitled" to set his own schedule and advance his own personal interests. The Board 
states: 
Inasmuch as the Claimant was responsible for maximizing his personal income, 
which in turn would maximize the revenue realized by the Employer, the 
majority of the Board found the Claimant was entitled to manipulate his schedule 
in order to meet client needs and to maximize revenue. (B. at 12) (emphasis 
added). 
.. .as a commission-only employee, and as an experienced salesman, the 
Claimant was entitled to a little latitude in his schedule in order to better meet 
clients needs and to maximize his personal income. (B. at 9)(emphasis added). 
.. .Claimant was entitled to some latitude in his schedule, particularly in light of 
the hours the Claimant worked each week and in light of the unique pay structure 
in this instance; the Claimant was paid solely on commissions. (B at 
1 l)(emphasis added). 
.. .because of the commission-only structure of the job and that he had the 
flexibility to schedule meetings with clients outside of the schedule outlined by 
the Employer. (B. at 13)(emphasis added). 
The Board appears to misunderstand the nature of Davis1 position. Davis was an 
employee of Prosper, not an independent contractor of Prosper. 
For purposes of minimum wage and overtime computation, the United State 
Department of Labor broadly distinguishes between inside sales employees and outside 
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sales employees. See generally 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act. 
As a telephone sales representative working at Prosper's place of business, Davis was an 
internal sale employee. As an inside sales employee, Davis was entitled to minimum 
wage and overtime compensation when applicable. Though one may argue an outside 
sales employee has a little more latitude in their schedules because they are not always 
working at their employer's premises, the Board appears to go beyond the inside/outside 
sales employees distinction and assert that anyone who works on commissions is 
"entitled" to act similar to an independent contractor; they can set their own schedules, 
advance their own interests, and choose whether to follow their employer's directions. 
Such analysis is contrary to the position filled by Davis. 
Though Davis was paid commissions, Davis had a schedule to adhere to, he was 
expected to arrive on time, he was expected to remain at work throughout his shift, and 
he was to adhere to the reasonable requests of his supervisor. Though the Board argues 
that Prosper's "unique pay structure", (B. at 9; 11), entitled Davis to this latitude, there 
was nothing so unique about Davis' compensation structure that "entitled" him to set his 
own schedule and advance his own interests. There is not substantial evidence when 
viewed in light of the whole record to support that Davis was not an employee and thus 
obligated to the same constraints as other employees. Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-
403(4)(g)(West 2009). 
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III. THE WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD ERRED IN RULING THAT THE 
ELEMENT OF CULPABILITY WAS NOT ESTABLISHED. 
The Board dedicates much of its brief to explaining why Davis? conduct was not 
culpable. The Board's conclusions are not supported by substantial evidence when 
viewed in light of the whole record. Grace Drilling Co., v. Board of Review, 116 P.2d 
63, 67 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). The Board asserts that Prosper failed to establish 
culpability arguing that all Prosper did was testify "that the Claimant's conduct could 
potentially result in such consequences." (B. at 10)(emphasis added). By its own 
admission, the Board confirms that the evidence supports a finding of culpability. 
Culpability can be found by establishing that conduct could result in potential harm. 
Fieeiki v. Department of Workforce Serv., 2005 UT App 398, *3, 122 P.3d 706, 707 
("The culpability standard, however, does not require actual harm to the employer, but 
only potential harm"). 
A. Davis' Conduct Resulted in Injury to Prospers Legitimate Interests. 
Ignoring the Board's admission of culpability, Prosper also testified that it was 
injured by Davis not adhering to the specified schedule which was designed to achieve 
higher success rates and greater revenue. (R. at 048:10-11). Prosper testified that not by 
not adhering to his schedule Davis missed appointments reflected poorly on Prosper and 
its partners. (R. at 047:38-42; 048:3-15). Prosper testified that Davis1 actions caused "a 
lack of trust from Employer to employee". (R. at 048:3-15). These are all direct injuries 
caused by Davis1 actions. 
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Though the Board argues that "it is not clear how the Claimant's conduct could 
have led to a loss of trust," (B. at 10), Prosper asserts that violating company rules, 
engaged in insubordinate behavior, coming and going as he pleased, ignored specific 
requests, missing appointments, demonstrating poor judgment, and establishing a 
pattern of non-compliance are all grounds for Prosper to lose trust in Davis. 
Even if the Board discount's Prosper's testimony that it lost trust in Davis, the 
Department's own Rules establish that an employer's legitimate business interests 
include "goodwill, efficiency, employee morale, discipline, honesty and trust". Utah 
Admin. Code R994-405-207 (2010) (emphasis added). Many of these legitimate 
business interests were impacted by Davis. 
Davis negatively impacted Prosper's "goodwill" by engaging in behavior that 
reflected poorly on Prosper and its partners (R. at 047:42-43). Prosper lost "efficiency" 
due to Davis failing to work his assigned hours which were designed to maximize 
contact rates. (R. at 063:5). Davis' conduct negatively impacted "employee morale" by 
his coming and going in front of others. Prosper also lost trust in Davis because he 
wasn't reliable. If conduct that impinges on goodwill, efficiency, discipline, morale and 
trust can be disqualifying even when it occurs away from the employer's premises 
during non-business hours as R994-405-207 provides, then a finding that such conduct 
occurring on Prosper's premises during business hours justifies a finding that Davis' 
conduct injured or could have injured Prosper's legitimate business interests. It was 
contrary to the weight of evidence and arbitrary or capricious for the Board to find that 
Prosper did not establish the element of culpability when Prosper establishes a loss of 
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trust, efficiency and goodwill. Utah Code Ann. §§ 63G-4-403(4)(g), 63G-4-403(4)(d) 
& 63G-4-403(4)(h)(iv)(West 2009). 
B. The Board admits Davis' Non-Conforming Behavior was Culpable. 
The Board argues that while Prosper was no doubt frustrated with Davis, "there 
is no indication in the record that the Claimant's conduct led to disciplinary problems or 
undermined the Employer's authority." (B. at 10). Once again the Board's own 
argument concedes culpability was established. If the record establishes that Prosper 
was frustrated because Davis was not adhering to his assigned schedule, by definition, 
Davis himself was a disciplinary problem and Davis himself was undermining Prosper's 
authority. 
The Board not only confirms that Prosper was frustrated with Davis, but in an 
attempt to minimize Prosper's testimony the Board states "The Employer also failed to 
provide testimony the Claimant's conduct undermined its authority other than the 
Claimant was not always at work exactly when the Employer wanted him to be." (B. at 
10). (Emphasis added). The Board therefore agrees that Davis was insubordinate and 
disobedient by not being "always at work exactly when the Employer wanted him to 
be". 
In Stegen v. Department of Employment Sec., 751 P.2d 1160 (Utah App. 1988), 
this Court found that the employee was repeatedly absent despite verbal and written 
warnings. The employee demonstrated a disregard for the employer's attempts to bring 
about a change in attitude and behavior. In finding that the element of culpability had 
9 
been established, this Court held "that plaintiffs absenteeism was culpable conduct." 
Stegen at 1163. This conclusion is consistent with the Department's Rules that "It is the 
responsibility of a claimant to be punctual and remain at work within the reasonable 
requirements of the employer."l Utah Admin. Code R994-405-208(2)(a)(2010). 
By admitting that Davis "was not always at work when Prosper expected him to 
be," the Board establishes Davis engaged in conduct that was injurious or had the 
potential to be injurious to Prosper. As such, the conclusion that that the element of 
culpability was not established is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in 
the light of the whole record. Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(4)(g). 
C. Davis was not "Entitled" to Change his Schedule to Advance his Personal 
Interests. 
The Board argues that Prosper was not harmed by Davis's conduct because, as an 
experienced sales representative, Davis was "entitled to manipulate his schedule" in 
order to "maximize his personal income". (B. at 9; 12). The Board further argues that 
the "Claimant was entitled to a little latitude" in setting his schedule (B. at 11; R. at 
1
 The Board cites to RKB Industrial, Inc. v. Department of Workforce Serv., 2003 
UT App 180 and Whipple v. Department of Workforce Serv., 2004 UT App 479 as 
supporting the idea that culpability cannot by proven by tardiness or attendance 
violations alone. (B. at 10-11). The Court in RKB Industrial found that the employer 
was in fact not harmed by the employee's tardiness and the Whipple Court stated that 
tardiness alone was insufficient to establish culpability because "the employer had 
tolerated" her behavior. It is inaccurate to suggest that RKB Industrial and Whipple 
establish that an employee's tardiness or absences by themselves cannot be used to 
establish culpability. See Stegen v. Department of Employment Sec, 751 P.2d 1160, 
1163 (Utah App. 1988). Additionally, the Department's own Rule states "a discharge 
for absences or tardiness is disqualifying if the employee knew attendance rules were 
being violated." Utah Admin. Code R994-405-208(2)(a)(2010). 
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091).2 Such an assertion is arbitrary or capricious. Prosper is unaware of nor does the 
Board cite to, any law or regulation that "entitles" employees to set their own schedules 
and disregard their employer's directions either because they are paid commissions or 
because they are experienced. The Board was not reasonable or rational in asserting 
Davis was "entitled" to such latitude because he was paid commissions or because of his 
experience. 
Under common-law obligations between employers and employees, an employee 
owes a duty of loyalty and obedience to their employer. Jouflas v. Fox Television 
Stations, Inc., 927 P.2d 170, 173 (Utah 1996)(Employee was terminated for breaching 
his duties, including his duty of loyalty to his employer). There is nothing in the record 
to suggest that Davis was anything other than an employee. The duty of loyalty 
obligated Davis to put Prosper's interests ahead of his own. The Board seems to reverse 
this role and conclude that Davis was "entitled" to utilize Prosper's infrastructure, 
relationships and resources to "maximize his personal income". (B. at 9, 11, 12, 13) 
(emphasis added). Such a reversal of roles is not only unreasonable and irrational, but it 
is also arbitrary or capricious. The conclusion that Prosper was not injured because 
Davis was "entitled" to latitude in his employment to advance his own interests is not 
supported by substantial evidence when viewed in the light of the whole record. Utah 
Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(4)(g). 
2
 Even if Davis was "entitled" to a little latitude, which Prosper denies, Davis' 
conduct went well beyond being occasionally tardy. Davis either did not show up for 
work, arrived late, or left early on May 7, May 10, May 11, May 12, May 13 and May 
14. (008:Exhibit 8; 010:Exhibit 10; 043-044:23-44, 1-27). 
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D. Violation of the Department's Administrative Rules Establishes Injury or 
Potential Injury. 
The Board also advances the confusing argument that Davis? conduct was not 
culpable under the Department's Administrative Rules because it "is not about whether 
the provisions of the administrative code can be applied to Claimant." (B. at 9). The 
Board seems to suggest that though Davis's actions were contrary to various Utah 
Administrative Rules, such non-compliance does not mean that Prosper was injured by 
his behavior. However, the element of culpability in unemployment cases does not 
require a finding of actual harm, but only potential harm. Fieeiki v. Department of 
Workforce Serv., 2005 UT App 398, *3, 122 P.3d 706, 707. Since the Department 
Rules in question are listed under the general category of "Examples of Reasons for 
Discharge" (R994-405-208), violation of the Rules can be used to establish that conduct 
in violation of the standards has the potential for harm and a presumption of injury. 
Were it otherwise, the Rules referenced by Prosper would not be identified as "Reasons 
for Discharge". 
In this case, the evidence establishes that Prosper was injured or had the potential 
to be injured by Davis' conduct. The Board concedes that Davis came and when as he 
pleased even after being specifically warned in writing not to do so. (B. at 5). R994-
405-208(1 )(d) states that "An employer has the prerogative to establish and enforce 
work rules that further legitimate business interests." Prosper established that Davis 
was repeatedly instructed to work his assigned schedule and to contact his supervisor if 
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he needed to alter his schedule. Davis was shown to engage in culpable conduct by not 
following work rules that furthered Prospers legitimate business interests. 
R994-405-208(4)(2010) establishes that "An employer generally has the right to 
expect lines of authority will be followed." Davis ignored verbal and written warnings 
to adhere to a specific schedule. Prosper was injured or had the potential to be injured 
by Davis' insubordinate conduct. 
And, R994-405-208(2)(a)(2010) states that "It is the responsibility of a claimant 
to be punctual and remain at work within the reasonable requirements of the employer." 
Davis regularly failed to do so. (R. at 050:33-34). Prosper was injured or had the 
potential to be injured by Davis missing appointments, potentially causing a loss of 
goodwill with Prosper and its partners, a loss of efficiency and a loss of trust. Davis 
either did not show up for work, arrived late, or left early on May 7, May 10, May 11, 
May 12, May 13 and May 14. (008:Exhibit 8; OlOiExhibit 10; 043-044:23-44, 1-27). It 
is appropriate to conclude that an employee that is absent, late or did not remain at work 
for more than a week potentially injured his employer's efficiency and trust. 
Even if the Court does not accept the Board's admission that Prosper established 
injury through testimony that Davis' conduct could result in injury, Prosper testified that 
it was injured when Davis did not adhere to his assigned schedule that was designed to 
achieve higher success rates and greater revenue, (R. at 048:3-15), that Prosper was 
injured when Davis missed appointments which reflected poorly on Prosper and its 
partners, (R. at 047:38-42), and Prosper was injured when it lost trust in Davis as an 
employee. (R. at 048:19). This testimony was not controverter by Davis. There is not 
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substantial evidence in light of the whole record to support the finding that the element 
of "culpability" was not established. Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(4)(g). Awarding 
benefits was therefore arbitrary and capricious.3 Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-
403(4)(h)(iv). 
IV. THE WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD ERRED IN RULING THAT THE 
ELEMENT OF KNOWLEDGE WAS NOT ESTABLISHED. 
Davis was issued a written warning that instructed him to "Work your scheduled 
shift of M 8AM-5PM, T-TH 12AM-8PM, F 8AM-4PM and S 8:30 AM-1PM". (R. at 
009:Exhibit 9). Utah Administrative Code R994-405-202(2)(2010) provides "A 
specific warning is one way to show the claimant had knowledge of the expected 
conduct". Prosper not only provided a written warning consistent with R994-405-
202(2), but the record establishes that Prosper also issued numerous verbal warnings 
and email warnings. (073:22-25). It was not reasonable or rational for the Board to 
conclude Davis did not have "knowledge". Nevertheless, the Board argues that Davis 
lacked "knowledge" because: (1) Davis thought his schedule was a suggestion, (2) 
Prosper condoned Davis1 non-conforming behavior, and (3) Davis alleges he saw others 
coming and going and he felt he was entitled to do the same. Prosper asserts that Davis 
3
 It is also unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious for the Board to ignore Davis? 
intentional or negligent misrepresentations regarding his separation. In response to 
specific inquiries about his separation, Davis reported that he had not been told to 
change or improve his performance, that he had not received any warnings, that he was 
not discharged for violating a company policy, and he was not discharged for attendance 
problems. (R. at 012:Exhibit 12). Such disregard for the accuracy of his answers has led 
others to been found guilty of committing fraud in order to obtain benefits. Ellsworth v. 
Department of Workforce Serv., 2010 UT App 87. 
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"knew or should have known" of the behavior expected of him, but Davis simply chose 
not to comply. See Law Offices of David Paul White & Assoc, v. Board of Review, 778 
P.2d 21, 25 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
A. There is no Evidence to support the Claim that the Assigned Schedule 
was only a Suggestion. 
Though the Board advances the argument that Davis claimed his assigned 
schedule was a "suggestion", the Board fails to identify any corroborating evidence to 
support Davis' claim. By contrast, Prosper's actions from Davis' first day of 
employment through termination establish a consistent pattern of training, encouraging, 
warning and disciplining. Such methodical and measured approach cannot be viewed as 
a "suggestion" for Davis to adhere to his assigned schedule. 
The Board concedes that Davis was given a work schedule when he was hired. 
(B. at 12). Within the first month of employment, Davis was issued verbal and email 
warnings consistent with its initial directions. (073:22-25). When the verbal and email 
warnings did not change the behavior, Prosper issued Davis a written warning 
specifically stating "Work your scheduled shift". (R. at 009:Exhibit 9). The formal 
write-up also warned "Failure to correct the above actions immediately may result in 
future disciplinary action up to and including termination." Id. It is illogical for Prosper 
to issue Davis a written warning instructing him to work his assigned shift if it was only 
a "suggestion". It is also illogical for Davis to sign a written warning for failing to 
adhere to his shift if it was only a suggestion. The written warning was credible, 
competent, tangible evidence that directly contradicted Davis' uncorroborated 
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testimony. If there was a lack of "knowledge" it was because Davis chose to not listen 
and not because Prosper failed to communicate. Davis was regularly and repeatedly 
told verbally, by email and in writing to work his assigned schedule. (R. at 009.'Exhibit 
9; 48:25-36). 
B. Prosper Never Condoned Davis1 Behavior 
The Board suggests that though Prosper was dissatisfied and frustrated with 
Davis' conduct, Prosper "condoned the Claimant's behavior". (B. at 13). This cannot be 
further from the truth. The record clearly shows that Prosper issued Davis several 
verbal and email warnings expressing dissatisfaction with his behavior. (R. at 048:25-
36). When these efforts did not result in improved behavior, Prosper issued a written 
warning instructing Davis to "Work your scheduled shift of M 8AM-5PM, T-TH 
12AM-8PM5 F 8AM-4PM and S 8:30 AM-1PM". (R. at 009:Exhibit 9). The warning 
specifically informed Davis that failure to improve his performance could result in 
termination. Id. There is nothing in the record that validates the argument that Prosper 
condoned Davis1 behavior. Though the Board suggests that during Davisf last week of 
employment Prosper took no further corrective action, Prosper testified that it had 
"plenty of conversations" not only before the April 12 written warning "but also 
between the 12th of April and May 14th." (R. at 073:22-25). 
Additionally, in Law Offices of David Paul White & Assoc, v. Board of Review, 
778 P.2d 21, 25 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), the employee was given specific instructions 
regarding appropriate behavior. Though the behavior would improve for several days it 
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would to revert back to the former behavior. The Board in awarding benefits concluded 
that whatever counseling the employer gave was negated by the employer's continued 
acceptance of her behavior. Law Offices of David Paul White at 25. The Court 
"explicitly reject as not being reasonable and rational the Board's conclusion that 
'whatever counseling the employer gave . . . was negated by his continued acceptance of 
her behavior . . . on the basis that it does not reflect sound policy." Id. The Court agreed 
with the Board's dissenting opinion that "An employer who is willing to take ample time 
to work with an employee to resolve objectionable conduct ought not to be penalized 
when he finally terminates the employee who demonstrates improved performance for a 
period of time and then reverts again to unacceptable conduct." Id. 
Here, the Board is attempting to penalize Prosper by alleging that Prosper 
"condoned" Davis' conduct. It does not reflect sound policy to conclude that Prosper 
"condoned" Davis' conduct when it issued numerous verbal, email and written warnings 
within a two month period. It does not reflect sound policy to criticize Prosper for 
failing to issue further written warnings for tardiness or absences the week Davis was 
terminated. It does not reflect sound policy to conclude that Prosper "condoned" Davis' 
actions because it did not fire Davis sooner. Since Davis only worked at Prosper for 
two months, in light of the substantial testimony on verbal and other warnings, there is 
little basis to support the claim that Prosper condoned Davis' behavior. When Prosper 
methodically addressed the behavioral problem over such as short period of time, (R. at 
049:6-9), Prosper should not be deemed to have "condoned" the behavior. 
17 
Further, the Department's Rules provide that a discharge for absences or tardiness 
is disqualifying if the employee knew attendance rules were being violated. R994-405-
208(2)(a)(2010). The written warning issued on April 14, 2010, was signed by Davis 
and Davis testified that he "definitely" discussed it with his supervisor." (R. at 059:9-
17). Davis knew or should have known he was violating an enforced rule. It was 
neither reasonable for the Board to assert that Prosper condoned Davis? conduct, nor 
was it rational to argue Davis did not have "knowledge" of what was expected of him. 
Such conclusions are not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the 
whole record. Grace Drilling Co,, v. Board of Review, 116 P.2d 63, 67 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). 
C. Lack of "Knowledge" Cannot Be Based on a "Me Too" Justification. 
The Board also advances the argument that Davis was justified not adhering to 
his assigned schedule because others, including his supervisor, appeared to come and go 
at different times. (R. at 058:29-31). Davis provided no witnesses that corroborated his 
testimony. When challenged on his perception that others and went as they pleased, 
Davis admitted that he "assumed" others were assigned the same scheduled but did not 
know. (R. at 058:21-24). Similarly, Davis? supervisor specifically testified that he (the 
supervisor) in fact did not work the same schedule. (R. at 054:11-12). The "me too" 
justification is without merit. 
It is inappropriate for the Board to find that Davis didn't have "knowledge" that 
he was to adhere to a specific schedule because he "felt" he was entitled to some latitude 
18 
based on what he perceived others were doing. (R. at 091). Davis' feelings of 
entitlement do not refute competent credible evidence that Davis was repeatedly 
instructed to work a specific schedule. The Board argues that Davis had been allowed to 
alter his schedule without repercussions, (B. at 13-14), yet the record establishes that 
Davis was frequently and consistently issued additional warnings. Prosper testified 
about "frequent conversations about why he wasn't on time, why he was late, ... [n]ot 
only before the 12th of April, but also between the 12th of April and May 14th, plenty of 
verbal conversions." (R. at 073:22-26). Prosper also testified "Yes Your Honor, there 
are things that are missing here that I failed to provide. But, yes, text messages, 
conversations, plenty of other conversations that we had in regards to shift adherence 
that aren't listed here." (R. at 073:16-18). Since Davis "knew or should have know" the 
effect of his conduct would have on his employment, Law Offices of David Paul White 
& Assoc, v. Board of Review, 778 P.2d 21, 25 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), there is not 
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record to support the finding that 
Davis did not have "knowledge" of the conduct expected of him.4 A review of the 
record establishes that Davis did know what was expected of him and the Board's 
decision is arbitrary or capricious and should be reversed. 
4
 Even if Davis the Board is correct that Davis did not understand that he was to 
adhere to his assigned schedule, Davis knew that he needed to keep in touch with his 
supervisor when he altered his schedule. Davis regularly did not do. (R. at 050:18-34). 
When asked if Davis knew he was to keep in contact with his supervisor, Davis testified 
"Yes. That was expected." Davis' behavior of not keeping in touch with his supervisor 
resulted in many of the same injuries such as loss of efficiency and loss of trust. There 
is no dispute that this requirement was clearly known, injurious, and within Davis' 
control. 
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V. THE WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD IGNORES PROSPERS 
THOROUGH MARSHALING OF THE FACTS. 
The Board argues that Prosper failed to marshal the evidence to support of its 
claim that Davis was terminated for just cause. The Board asserts Prosper "marshaling 
only the evidence supporting its contention that the Claimant was discharged for just 
cause and ignoring any evidence contrary to its desired outcome." (B. at 6-7). Prosper 
asserts it satisfactorily marshaled the evidence as found throughout its brief, including 
the section specifically brief entitled Additional Marshaled Facts found at Pages 7-14. 
The Board did not identify a single fact that supported the Board's decision that Prosper 
did not marshal. Prosper therefore believes the Board's argument is without merit. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, this Court should reverse the Workforce Appeals 
Board's award of unemployment benefits to Davis on the grounds the decision is not 
supported by substantial evidence when viewed in the light of the whole record, the 
Agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law, or the decision is otherwise 
arbitrary or capricious. Utah Code Ann. §§ 63G-4-403(4)(d), 63G-4-403(4)(g) & 63G-
4-403(4)(h)(iv)(West 2009). 
Respectfully submitted this ft day of March, 2011. 
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Counsel for Appellant/Petitioner 
Prosper Team, Inc. 
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